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NOTE
Liability for Proceeding with
Unfounded Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
The current concern about groundless litigation' has anteced-
ents stretching from the jurisprudence of ancient Mesopotamia
2
through the biblical admonition not to bear false witness against
one's neighbor3 to the draconian solution of removing the frivolous
complainant's tongue resorted to on occasion by the Anglo-Saxons.,
In the United States several techniques purport to help control
spurious litigation. Chief among these are the common-law tort of
malicious prosecution, 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,1 and
the inherent disciplinary powers of the courts.7 Other vehicles,
1. See Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Un-
justified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 1003 (1977); Gold, Controlling
Procedural Abuses: The Role of Costs and Inherent Judicial Authority, 9 OTrAwA L. Rzy. 44
(1977); Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective, 70 F.R.D. 212
(1976); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MwN. L. Rav. 1 (1976); Wills, Assault with a Deadly
Lawsuit: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 51 L.A. B.J. 499 (1976); Note, Habitual Plain-
tiffs in Federal Court and the Surrogate Pleader Approach, 45 U. CQ. L. REv. 577 (1976);
Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and Abuse of Process as
Remedies for Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN. L. Rav. 604 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Note, Physician Countersuits]; Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious
Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Groundless Litigation].
2. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1218 n.1.
3. Exodus 20:16 (Revised Standard Version).
4. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1221 n.26. The author observes that
the offender could be required to compensate his opponent in lieu of losing his tongue if the
latter option "proved distasteful." Id. at 1221 n.27. Distasteful to whom, one is not told.
5. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRn §§ 119-120 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 674-681 (1977). Both Prosser and the Restatement
refer to the malicious prosecution action as one for "wrongful use of civil proceedings" when
the action complained of is civil.
6. The rule reads in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is
signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
7. See generally Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the
Judicial Process, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 619 (1977).
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with marginal relevance to the problem of groundless suit, include
the judicially created federal bad faith exception to the rule against
recovery of attorneys' fees,' the federal statutory sanctions for the
attorney "who so multiples the proceedings . . . as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously,"' and special statutory provi-
sions such as section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."'
Because these methods of deterring groundless litigation and
affording a remedy to those injured thereby have widely disparate
historical backgrounds, the common tendency, both scholarly" and
judicial, 12 is to consider them in isolation from one another. Hence,
there is no uniformity as to the appropriate standard of culpability
or the appropriate punitive and compensatory measures; all de-
pends on whether the particular court views the problem through
the lens of malicious prosecution, the lens of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, or some other lens. Moreover, the fact that some of
the approaches, by their nature, are available only at the state
level and others only at the federal level compounds this problem
of nonuniformity.
A recent federal decision, Nemeroff v. Abelson, 3 suggests that
the standards embodied in Rule 11, the malicious prosecution ac-
tion, the federal bad faith exception, and the court's inherent equi-
table power are closely akin."4 This assertion, however, is more an
aspiration than a description of reality. Nonetheless, this Note
maintains that such a unitary view of the problem of curtailing
groundless litigation is sorely needed. This Note first describes and
evaluates the primary tools now used to deter meritless suits and
sometimes compensate their victims. The Note then proposes a
unified procedural approach to groundless litigation that allows for
different grades of culpability.
Three notes of caution are in order as a preliminary matter.
First, once a decision has been reached to impose liability for
groundless suit, there remains the question of whether the frivolous
8. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (2d
Cir. 1977); Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319
(1977).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) (authorizing court to assess "reasonable costs," including
"reasonable attorneys' fees," against either party in certain securities-related litigation).
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Cases taking a synoptic view of the techniques of controlling meritless litigation are
more the exception than the rule. For one of the exceptions, see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F.
Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 640.
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claimant, or his attorney, or both should bear such liability. Sec-
ond, meritless plaintiffs are not the only culprits; groundless and
dilatory motions by defense counsel may be a problem of equal
magnitude."5 Although this Note focuses on plaintiffs at the trial
level, 16 analogous considerations apply to defendants at the trial
level and to both parties at the appellate level." Last, and most
important, any system for discouraging meritless litigation should
take into account society's interest in having legitimate grievances
disclosed, aggressively advocated, and, to the extent possible, rem-
edied. It is a truism that legal doctrine changes. Efforts to curb
unfounded litigation must not chill the processes by which new le-
gal theories evolve. 8 As one scholar has written:
Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an
organic process in which a concept is conceived, then derided as absurd
(and clearly not the law), then accepted as theoretically tenable
(though not the law), then accepted as the law. . . . How might the
law have developed if, prior to 1954, an attorney might have been [dis-
ciplined] for asserting, contrary to settled Supreme Court case law, that
separate but equal was not equal?"
It is clear that "groundlessness" must not be defined so broadly or
punished so harshly as to destroy our legal system's capacity for
innovation or to discourage the airing of just grievances.
II. THm TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
A. Background and Applications
After the Norman Conquest a system known as amercement
developed in England 2 under which most losing plaintiffs were re-
quired to pay or find pledges who would pay the court2 a penalty
graded according to the magnitude of the injury done.2 Wronged
15. See Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44 FORD-
HAM L. Rxv. 1069 (1976).
16. The scope of this Note is also limited to civil litigation.
17. See Note, Disincentives to Frivolous Appeals: An Evaluation of an ABA Task
Force Proposal, 64 VA. L. Rlv. 605 (1978).
18. See Risinger, supra note 1, at 57.
19. Id.
20. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1222.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1223. By contrast, the old Anglo-Saxon monetary penalty of wer, which could
be imposed on a groundless complainant in lieu of loss of tongue, see note 4 supra, was
graded according to that complainant's status. Id. at 1221. It is important to remember that
in the early medieval view God was the ultimate judge and an unsuccessful suit was neces-
sarily a false one. Id. at 1222; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE. IME OF EDWARD I, at 539, 598-602 (2d ed. 1898). In light of this heritage, it is not




defendants, however, received no compensation." In 1293 the Stat-
ute of Champerty 4 established the writ of conspiracy, which ena-
bled injured defendants to sue those who maliciously brought mer-
itless actions through straw claimants.25 The gradual decline of
amercement" led by Tudor-Stuart times to a new round of statu-
tory activity.27 Cost statutes developed that expanded defendants'
ability to recover their litigation expenses from meritless claim-
ants.2 In the seventeenth century the action on the case 2 was held
to lie for "manifest vexation" stemming from groundless suits. It
was from these antecedents that the tort of malicious prosecution




Under this English Rule, five elements must be proved: initia-
tion or continuation of a prior suit, lack of probable cause for the
prior action, malice in instituting or continuing the prior suit, ter-
mination of the prior action in favor of the original defendant, and
some form of damage to the original defendant beyond that nor-
mally inflicted by similar litigation.3 2 The fifth element, commonly
known as the special damage requirement, is discarded by the Re-
statement Rule, which requires only that the wronged party show
"either material harm or the violation of a legal right that is in
itself sufficient to support an action for damages. '33 Under both
rules, damages can be recovered for all expenses and injury occa-
sioned by the wrongful suit. Punitive damages are also permitted
under both approaches. 4
The first element of the tort, the prior suit requirement, has
generated relatively little controversy. A minority of courts has
23. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 536 (1924).
24. The statute has been recorded erroneously as 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 3 (1305). The correct
date is 21 Edw. 1 (1293). See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1224 nn.52 & 53.
25. Id. at 1225 n.56.
26. Id. at 1226 n.63.
27. Id. at 1226 n.64.
28. Id. at 1226-27. Recovery under these costs statutes generally did not extend to con-
sequential damages such as those resulting from attachment of property. Id. at 1227 n.65.
29. English courts of this period often resorted to the action on the case when they
wished to fashion a cause of action that fell outside the ambit of the existing writs. See
generally C. FnWooT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 66-92
(1949).
30. Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698). The case involved a false crimi-
nal indictment, but the court stated in dictum that similar principles would apply when the
action complained of was civil. Id.
31. See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 518 n.3, 569 P.2d 561, 564 n.3 (1977).
32. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 120.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, Comment e (1977).
34. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1220 nn.15 & 16.
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held that no liability for malicious prosecution can arise out of a
civil proceeding unless there has been interference with the original
defendant's person or property. This view is so closely akin to the
special damage requirement that the two will be discussed together
later.
Definitions of probable cause vary.3 A common denominator of
the numerous formulae seems to be a requirement that a reasona-
ble or cautious person,3' in light of facts known or ascertainable by
reasonable inquiry,38 would have believed he had a cause of ac-
tion."9 Courts seldom make clear, however, whether they are apply-
ing in this connection the reasonable prudent person standard °
found in the negligence field. The occasional use of words such as
"cautious" 1 suggests a more stringent criterion, but this may sim-
ply be abuse of the terminology. The cases are agreed that the orig-
inal plaintiff need not have been positive of the legal outcome in
order for probable cause to be found; a reasonably sustainable in-
terpretation is sufficient.2 According to some decisions, dismissal of
the underlying action by the party who brought it is prima facie
evidence of lack of probable cause.' 3 Otherwise, termination of the
underlying action in favor of the original defendant generally raises
no ,inference that probable cause was absent in the institution of
that suit."
The requirement of malice has also engendered definitional
problems. According to one common formulation, malice exists
when an action is brought primarily for a purpose other than the
adjudication of the merits.'" Filing of a suit for settlement value or
for delay would fit this definition; personal animosity-"malice" in
the vernacular sense-is not required. Some decisions have at-
35. E.g., Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489, 490, 56 N.E. 198, 199
(1900).
36. See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1234 n.113.
37. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 335, 326 P.2d 918, 926 (1958).
38. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
The scope of the duty of inquiry is unclear and might vary depending on the nature of the
litigation. See Note, Physician Countersuits, supra note 1, at 609-10.
39. See note 37 supra.
40. See generally C. MoRms, ToRS 53-56 (1953); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at §§ 32-
33.
41. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
42. E.g., Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Herlein, 543 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Col. App. 1975).
43. E.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 474, 71 N.W. 558, 563 (1897). Contra, Warner v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 178 F. Supp. 481, 483 (M.D.N.C. 1959).
44. E.g., Barton v. Woodward, 32 Idaho 375, 379, 182 P. 916, 917 (1919); Milner v.
Hare, 125 Me. 460, 462, 134 A. 628, 629 (1926).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 676 (1977).
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tached importance to the presence of ill will in the institution of
the underlying suit, but this seems to be viewed as a particular
form of malice rather than as an essential element of it." Other
cases have defined malice in terms of reckless disregard of the orig-
inal defendant's rights.47 Absence of probable cause may raise an
inference of malice," but the two standards are fundamentally dif-
ferent: the probable cause criterion is an objective standard,
whereas the malice requirement addresses the original plaintiff's
motivation.
The requirement of termination of the underlying action in
favor of the original defendant has not provoked much debate. A
judgment in favor of the defendant would of course meet the defini-
tion. So would voluntary dismissal by the original plaintiff." Ter-
mination by way of settlement, however, would not." An exception
to this requirement is sometimes made when the proceeding com-
plained of was ancillary in character, as in the case of attachment
or arrests under civil process.51
Most controversial is the special damage requirement. Seven-
teen states follow the English Rule requiring the original defendant
to show some injury beyond the damage ordinarily resulting from
similar litigation.52 Interference with the person, such as arrest
46. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 120, at 855 nn.53 & 54.
47. See, e.g., Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 151 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1967). "While
• ..wilful and wanton disregard for the fact may be the basis for malice, such wanton and
willful conduct must be of such a nature and character as to evince a hostile or vindictive
motive." Id.
48. See, e.g., Crouter v. United Adjusters, Inc., 266 Or. 6, 8-10, 510 P.2d 1328, 1329-30
(1973).
49. E.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 674, Comment j (1977).
50. E.g., Nolan v. Allstate Home Equip. Co., 149 A.2d 426, 429 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1959); Fenton Storage Co. v. Feinstein, 129 Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 133-34, 195 A. 176, 179-80
(1937).
51. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 120, at 853-54. The exception is sometimes said to
embrace all ex parte proceedings. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 674, Comment k
(1977).
52. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 641 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Pair v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 Ga. App. 149, 150, 253 S.E.2d 828, 829-30 (1979) (refers to mali-
cious prosecution in civil context as "malicious use of process"); Petrick v. Kaminski, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 649, 650, 386 N.E.2d 636, 637 (1979); Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Iowa 158, 160-61, 66
N.W.2d 121, 123 (1954); Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Ky. 1951); Krashes
v. White, 275 Md. 549, 554-55, 341 A.2d 789, 801 (1975) ("malicious use of civil process");
Penwag Property Co. v. Landau, 148 N.J. Super. 493, 500-01, 372 A.2d 1162, 1165-66 (1977);
Farmers Gin Co. v. Ward, 73 N.M. 405, 409, 389 P.2d 9, 12 (1964); Williams v. Williams, 23
N.Y.2d 592, 596 n.2, 246 N.E.2d 333, 335 n.2, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473, 477 n.2 (1969); Stanback v.
Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 202, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979); Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v.
Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489, 490, 56 N.E. 198, 199 (1900); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 519,
569 P.2d 561, 564 (1977); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 76-80, 389 A.2d
607, 608-10 (1978); Ring v. Ring, 102 R.I. 112, 114-15, 228 A.2d 582, 584 (1967); Louis v.
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under civil process" or commitment under lunacy proceedings," is
special damage. Courts have also found certain interferences with
property to be special damage.A5 Twenty-three states have either
dispensed with the special damage requirement or never imposed
it." The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not include this
requirement .
5
Adherents of the English Rule stress the danger, inherent in
the malicious prosecution action, of discouraging some honest liti-
gants from pressing their claims." According to these authorities,
the special damage requirement mitigates that danger by reducing
the number of malicious prosecution actions that can prevail. 9
Some courts argue that the English Rule's restrictive requirements
promote judicial economy by preventing an interminable crossfire
of suit and countersuit." It has been asserted that an award of
costs generally provides adequate compensation for the victim of a
Blalock, 543 S.W.2d 715, 718-19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d
211, 215-16, 266 P.2d 1047, 1050 (1954); Schier v. Denny, 9 Wis. 2d 340, 344-45, 101 N.W.2d
35, 37-38 (1960). See also Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380-81 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
53. See, e.g., Woodley v. Coker, 119 Ga. 226, 228, 46 S.E. 89, 90 (1903) (refers to mali-
cious prosecution in civil context as "malicious use of legal process").
54. See, e.g., Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 277-78, 151 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1967).
55. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 234 Or. 255, 259, 381 P.2d 499, 501 (1963)
(garnishment).
56. Turner v. J. Blach & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 128, 5 So. 2d 93, 94 (1941); Ackerman v.
Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 112-14, 15 P.2d 966, 967 (1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 318-
19, 290 S.W.2d 632, 633 (1956); Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 126-27, 4 P. 1106,
1108-09 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 464-65, 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932); Calvo v.
Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 397, 152 A. 311, 311 (1930); Burchell v. Bechert, 356 So. 2d 377,
378-79 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978); McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 540-41 (1882); Carbondale
Inv. Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 336, 72 P. 781, 784 (1903); Graffagnini v. Shnaider, 164
La. 1108, 1111, 115 So. 287, 288 (1927); Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 343 Mass. 258, 261,
178 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1961); Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 596-98, 36 N.W. 664, 667-68
(1888); O'Neill v. Johnson, 53 Minn. 439, 441, 55 N.W. 601, 601 (1893); Harvill v. Tabor, 240
Miss. 750, 753-54, 128 So. 2d 863, 864 (1961); Young v. Jack Boring's, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 887,
895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 392-94,
88 N.W. 497, 497-98 (1901); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 464-70, 71 N.W. 558, 559-61 (1897);
Johnson v. Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 76, 72 P.2d 715, 716 (1937) (example of injury to "credit and
reputation"); Cissons v. Pickens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 43, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825
(1972); Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 324-25, 174 N.W. 620, 621 (1919); Buda v.
Cassel Bros., 568 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 214-
22 (1869); Van Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 309-11, 40 S.E.2d 332,
336-37 (1946).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 674, Comment e (1977) (wronged party must
show material harm or violation of a legal right that would itself support action for
damages).
58. E.g., O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 519, 569 P.2d 561, 564 (1977) (although the
court expressed some doubt about the utility of the special damage requirement and inti-
mated that it might not impose it if the case were one of first impression).
59. See, e.g., Perry v. Arsham, 101 Ohio App. 285, 287, 136 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1956).
60. See, e.g., id.
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groundless suit, so that he is not justified in seeking additional re-
lief unless he °has sustained some extraordinary injury."
Proponents of the Restatement Rule, although conceding that
courts should be open to all who have legitimate grievances, point
out that there are also important interests in deterring meritless
suits 2 and compensating those injured by them." Under this view,
the malicious prosecution plaintiff's burden of showing malice and
lack of probable cause provides adequate protection for honest liti-
gants. 4 The risk of a protracted exchange of suits and countersuits
is minimized, it is argued, by the difficulty of proving the basic
elements of the tort; such additional impediments as the special
damage requirement are not needed. 5 Moreover, the interest in ju-
dicial economy-invoked by some English Rule supporters to jus-
tify restrictions on countersuits'6-is equally good ammunition for
Restatement Rule advocates, Who emphasize deterrence of ground-
less suits as a vital policy consideration. 7 Finally, authorities that
espouse the Restatement Rule reject the assertion that the award
of costs ordinarily provides sufficient redress for one subjected to a
groundless suit. They note that costs, as defined for most purposes
in the United States, 8 are relatively trivial in comparison with the
total expense of defending a suit."
Even when the elements of malicious prosecution have been
proved, the advice-of-counsel defense may bar recovery. This de-
fense7 consists of a showing that the malicious prosecution defen-
dant' in instituting the original suit, followed the advice of appar-
ently competent counsel who acted in a professional capacity and
to whom the defendant 7 presented the facts accurately and com-
pletely.7 3 Under these circumstances, courts have often stated, the
61. See, e.g., id.
62. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975).
63. See, e.g., Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 215-.22 (1869).
64. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 120, at 851.
65. See, e.g., Note, Physician Countersuits, supra note 1, at 608.
66. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
67. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
68. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv. 792
(1966). See also text accompanying notes 207-15 infra.
69. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 120, at 851.
70. The term "defense," though frequently used in the literature, may be too strong.
Some courts prefer to regard advice of counsel simply as evidence on the question of proba-
ble cause. The practical result is often the same. See, e.g., Warner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 178 F.
Supp. 481, 482 (M.D.N.C. 1959) (advice of competent counsel after full disclosure of facts
held conclusive on issue of probable cause).
71. The plaintiff in the underlying suit.
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 1956); Johnson v.
[Vol. 33:743
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client will not be held liable for the attorney's derelictions.74 Never-
theless, a lawyer against whom the elements of the malicious prose-
cution action are proved can be held liable as a joint tortfeasor
with his client.7 5 Lack of malice does not always insulate the
attorney from liability. If he has no reasonable basis for think-
ing that there is probable cause to bring suit and is cognizant of his
client's malicious motives in instituting the proceeding, the attor-
ney may be held liable even though malice on his part has not been
demonstrated.76 Unfortunately, few courts have addressed this
question."
B. Some Variants: Abuse of Process and the Proposed Counter-
claim for Groundless Suit
An action for abuse of process lies against one who makes use
of process for an improper purpose, 8 causing damage to another.7 9
Lack of probable cause need not be shown; nor is it necessary that
the underlying action end in favor of the original defendant.0 De-
spite these salient differences between abuse of process and mali-
cious prosecution, courts occasionally state erroneously that there
is no distinction between the two.' There is controversy over
Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 76, 72 P.2d 715, 716-17 (1937).
74. E.g., Weidlich v. Weidlich, 177 Misc. 246, 252, 30 N.Y.S.2d 326, 332 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
75. E.g., Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 595-96, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344
(1967) (attorney brought suit for exaggerated sales price, knowing the claim's falsity, in ef-
fort to make purchaser pay that amount).
76. E.g., Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 241-42, 28 N.W.2d 780, 792 (1947).
77. Courts have not been receptive to the argument that liability of an attorney to an
opposing party can be predicated on a simple negligence standard. In Bickel v. Mackie, 447
F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978), the court stated:
Plaintiff correctly notes. . . the general trend toward relaxation of privity requirements
where third parties rely to their detriment on the conduct of a professional. . . . How-
ever, in the present case there is no question of reliance of third parties who are adver-
saries in judicial proceedings. The attorney owes his primary and paramount duty to
his client. The very nature of the adversary process precludes reliance by opposing
parties. While it is true that the attorney owes a general duty to the judicial system,
it is not the type of duty which translates into liability for negligence to an opposing
party where there is no foreseeable reliance by that party on the attorney's conduct.
Id. at 1381. See also O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 524, 569 P.2d 561, 567 (1977) (leaving
open the possibility of an injured opposing party's action against a negligent attorney, but
holding that any such action could only reach injuries already covered by the malicious
prosecution tort).
78. The claim on which the process is based may be legitimate. Baird v. Aluminum
Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 1957). Some courts have defined abuse of process as the
use of justified process for an unjustifiable purpose. See, e.g., id.
79. See generally W. PRosSER, supra note 5, at § 121.
80. See id. at p. 856.
81. E.g., Delk v. Colonial Fin. Co., 118 Ohio App. 451, 454, 194 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1963).
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whether injuries to business and reputation are compensable
under abuse of process, as they generally are in a malicious prose-
cution action,8 2 or whether recovery is limited to damage to person
and property. 3 Advice of counsel is not a defense to an action for
abuse of process.84 An attorney who encourages or collaborates
with others in an abuse of process, knowing of the improper pur-
pose, may be held liable as a joint tortfeasor 5
A valuable student Note has called for the supersession of the
malicious prosecution action by a compulsory counterclaim8 for
groundless suit. The author observes that in England costs, be-
cause they encompass attorney's fees,88 constitute a much more po-
tent deterrent to wrongful suit than they do in the United States."
Subsequent actions of malicious prosecution were developed in En-
gland only for those special cases in which the normal internal
sanction of costs would be inadequate." In this country, by con-
trast, the atrophy of the costs sanction91 has forced the malicious
prosecution action to carry a disproportionate share of the burden
of deterring false suits and compensating their victims.
2
The student author criticizes this heavy reliance on subse-
quent litigation, pointing out that the person subjected to ground-
less litigation may lack the resources to prosecute a countersuit. 3
In addition, the expenses of the countersuit are normally not re-
coverable. 4 The meritless claimant, whether he wins or loses the
countersuit, has tied up the opponent in litigation for a substantial
period and may consider that delay to be worth the risk of incur-
ring liability for malicious prosecution. 5 Honest original claimants
are potentially harassed by meritless countersuits. Determination
on the groundlessness issue within the underlying action, however,
82. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
83. See Note, Physician Countersuits, supra note 1, at 620-21.
84. This result follows from the fact that probable cause is not relevant to the ques-
tion whether there has been an abuse of process. See W. PRosSaR, supra note 5, § 121, at
856.
85. Note, Physician Countersuits, supra note 1, at 621.
86. The counterclaim would be like those envisaged by FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). If the
defendant refrained from bringing the counterclaim at the outset, he would be barred from
raising the claim in a subsequent suit.
87. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1234 n.110.
88. See generally Gold, supra note 1.
89. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1229.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1229 n.79.
92. Id. at 1229-30.
93. Id. at 1230-31.
94. Id. at 1220 n.15.
95. Id. at 1231.
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would at least shorten the period of exposure to potential counter-
suit and attendant uncertainty." Finally, reliance on subsequent
actions results in wasteful relitigation of identical or nearly identi-
cal facts."
For these reasons, the student author concludes, the internal
sanction of a compulsory counterclaim for groundless suit would be
preferable to the present approach. Proof of the counterclaim
would require a showing that the original claimant lacked probable
cause for suit; resolution of this issue would largely coincide with
the case on the merits so that duplication of proof would be mini-
mized." The original defendant would have the burden of showing
such a paucity of reasonably reliable evidence that no reasonable
person could have believed the action might prevail.' ® The judge's
decision on the question of probable cause would follow the deci-
sion on the merits of the underlying suit.01 Compensatory damages
would be awarded for any injury caused by the unfounded suit. 02
Malice would be an aggravating circumstance possibly justifying
punitive damages. 03 The author suggests that if the counterclaim
fails, the original plaintiff should have a similar cause of action for
groundless defense, subject to the burden of showing lack of prob-
able cause for the counterclaim." 4
C. Critique
The action for malicious prosecution, whether defined accord-
ing to the English or the Restatement Rule, is both an unsatisfac-
tory means of discouraging unfounded litigation and an inadequate
compensatory device. The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit
bears a heavy burden of proof.0 5 This fact is not in itself objection-
able because there is an important policy interest in protecting
honest litigants. Even if the plaintiff sustains his burden, however,
there has been considerable redundancy of proof,' and the plaintiff
has suffered delay and expense that could have been avoided by a
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1232.
98. Id. at 1234.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1234-35 n.115.
101. Id. at 1235.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1235 n.120.
104. Id. at 1237 n.130.
105. See text accompanying notes 31-57 supra.
106. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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system of sanctions internal to the underlying suit."' The action for
abuse of process is subject to the same criticisms.
The arguments for the proposed counterclaim for groundless
suit"°' are cogent. One drawback of such an approach is the poten-
tial for" confusion that results from the fact that although proof of
the case on the merits and proof on the issue of probable cause
would largely coincide, the original defendant would have to meet
a stricter standard to show lack of probable cause than to prevail
on the merits."9 The risk of confusion is reduced, however, by the
requirement that probable cause be an issue for the judge, as is
almost always the case in the traditional malicious prosecution
action.110 A greater problem is presented in the following hypo-
thetical situation: Defendant brings an unsuccessful counterclaim
for groundless suit; plaintiff then files an unsuccessful claim for
groundless defense; defendant then counterclaims alleging the
groundlessness of the groundless defense claim; and so on ad infin-
itum. Since it is less time-consuming and expensive to bring a
claim within an existing action than to bring a new suit, the dis-
incentives to a duel of claim and counterclaim would be less than
the disincentives under the present system to a duel of suit and
countersuit. The trial judge would have to be allowed consider-
able discretion to call a halt to the skirmish in such a situation.
These reservations notwithstanding, the balance of the argu-
ments weighs in favor of the proposed counterclaim or a similar
vehicle. The exponent of that approach, however, confined his at-
tention to the field of malicious prosecution. This Note will seek to
draw upon the lessons learned in other procedural contexts, but
will draw upon the proposed counterclaim as an integral part of a
unified system.
III. FEDERAL RuLE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
A. Background and Applications
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides in part that an
attorney's signature on a pleading "constitutes a certificate by
107. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 93-103 supra.
109. See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1234-35.
110. Id. at 1235 n.116.
111. The rule requires that at least one attorney of record sign every pleading of a
party represented by counsel. A party who proceeds pro se must sign his own pleading.
Except as otherwise mandated, for example, by FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 relating to derivative
actions by shareholders, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavits. FED.
R. Cirv. P. 11.
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him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay.""' An unsigned pleading, or
one signed with intent to defeat the purpose of Rule 11, "may be
stricken as sham and false.""' In such a case the action "may pro-
ceed as though the pleading had not been served."" 4 An attorney
who willfully violates the rule is subject to "appropriate discipli-
nary action.""'
The important issues for this Note are the meaning of "good
ground" and the nature of the sanctions available in a given case.
One can conceive of many ways in which a pleading could lack
good ground. At one extreme, - the attorney might know that the
facts alleged were untrue."' Alternatively, the facts alleged, though
not positively known to be untrue, might be based solely on specu-
lation-as when the plaintiff, unsure who assaulted him, picked a
name from the telephone directory on a hunch and sued that per-
son."7 Between these egregious cases and the case in which the al-
legations have good ground by almost any definition lie innumer-
able gradations; at some point along this spectrum, the line of
demarcation between lacking good ground and having good ground
must be drawn. A separate but related question arises when the
facts alleged, though not false or purely speculative, do not by
any reasonable inference support the legal proposition on behalf of
which they are offered."'
It is also appropriate to consider some of the effects Rule 11
does not have, though an overly literal reading might suggest that
it does. The right to make alternative and inconsistent allegations,
at least when a genuine uncertainty exists,"' is assured elsewhere
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 20 hence, a pleading will
not be held to lack good ground solely because it contains such





116. See, e.g., In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954).
117. Risinger, supra note 1, at 54. Cf. Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
118. An action may be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The question for our purpose is whether it is possi-
ble to advance a legal position so frivolous as to warrant disciplinary action under Rule 11.
119. See, e.g., City of Kingsport v. Steel & Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir.
1974).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
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tutes a certificate by him that the pleading is "not interposed for
delay."'"' As a practical matter, this provision should probably be
read "not interposed solely or primarily for delay.""12 It is most
unlikely that the sanctions of Rule 11 would be imposed by the
court simply because tactical considerations figured peripherally in
the filing of an otherwise meritorious pleading. 12E Such a literalistic
approach is especially unlikely in view of the comparative reluc-
tance of courts to resort to Rule 11 at all.'24 Of course, if the stric-
tures against pleadings interposed for delay are given the modified
interpretation suggested above, this portion of the rule is largely
superfluous because a pleading filed solely for delay is groundless
by almost any definition and can be dealt with under the good
ground requirement.
2 5
In relatively few cases, however, has Rule 11 figured promi-
nently 2 and in even fewer have violations been found. 27 It is prob-
ably futile to attempt to elucidate a general definition of the phrase
"good ground" on the basis of such meager decisional tradition. In-
stead, several representative cases will be discussed to illustrate
fact patterns that may lead to a finding of lack of good ground and
also to exemplify the sanctions that may be imposed.
The earliest reported decision finding a Rule 11 violation is
American Automobile Association v. Rothman.1 21 Plaintiffs AAA and
121. FED. R. Cir. P. 11.
122. See Risinger, supra note 1, at 8.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 34-35.
125. Risinger cites this redundancy as an example of what he euphemistically terms
the "less than careful draftsmanship" of Rule 11. Id. at 8 n.20.
126. The number cannot be stated with any exactitude because it is often very difficult
to determine whether Rule 11 is one of the grounds for a given decision or whether the refer-
ence to the rule is merely precatory. See, e.g., Misegades, Douglas, & Levy v. Sonnenberg,
76 F.R.D. 384, 385-86 (E.D. Va. 1976).
127. This author has found only fifteen cases that have held a pleading to violate Rule
11: Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1977); Bertucelli v.
Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Ferrer Delgado v. Sylvia de Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979 (D.P.R. 1976); Misegades, Doug-
las, & Levy v. Sonnenberg, 76 F.R.D. 384 (E.D. Va. 1976) (but see note 126 supra); Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Econo-Car
Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8 (D.V.I. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499
F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974); Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 15
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1517 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); Lewis v.
Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971): Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bill's Farm Center, Inc., 52
F.R.D. 114 (W.D. Mo. 1970), affd per curiam, 449 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971); Spencer v.
Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968); Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Nichols v. Alker, 126 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1956); In re
Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Los Angeles
County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954); American Auto. Ass'n v. Rothman, 104
F. Supp. 665 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), modifying 101 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
128. 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), modifying 101 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Automobile Club of New York sued a filling station operator for trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition.'29 Defendant pled as a
defense plaintiffs' alleged violation of the Fair Trade Act of New
York, but when questioned on deposition stated that she "wouldn't
know anything" about plaintiffs' violation of the Act or any injury
plaintiffs were inflicting upon her business.'30 Defendant also filed a
counterclaim alleging that plaintiffs abrogated a contract for the
display of their insignia at her filling station and for rebates by her
to AAA and Club members.1 31 At the time the answer and counter-
claim were filed, defendant's attorney had not seen any such con-
tract running to defendant. 3 About six months later, and roughly
two months prior to the adjudication of plaintiffs' motions for sum-
mary judgment and dismissal of the counterclaim, defendant's at-
torney definitely ascertained that the alleged contract never ex-
isted, but took no steps to withdraw the counterclaim. 33 The court
granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment, dismissed the counter-
claim, and then undertook to determine whether defendant's at-
torney had violated Rule 11.11 The attorney was first afforded an
opportunity to submit an explanatory statement to the court.
When his statement "proved unsatisfactory in form and sub-
stance,"'35 he was invited to, and did, appear in person and make a
statement for the record. 31 As to the inconsistency between the al-
legation that plaintiffs had violated the Fair Trade Act and defen-
dant's ignorance of any such interference with her business, defen-
dant's attorney referred to "trade confusion" and asserted that he
had really meant to rely on a different statute.'37 The court, though
unimpressed with this "justification,' ' 3 concluded that further
Rule 11 inquiry was not warranted with respect to the Fair Trade
Act allegation because there had been at least "a semblance of an
issue of law."'' As to the counterclaim, defendant's attorney as-
serted lamely that he had "thought of" withdrawing the breach of
contract allegation after he discovered that no such contract had
existed.'" The court, observing that one purpose of Rule 11 is "to
129. 101 F. Supp. at 193.
130. Id. at 195.
131. Id. at 193-94.
132. Id. at 196.
133. 104 F. Supp. at 656.
134. 101 F. Supp. at 195, 197.
135. 104 F. Supp. at 655.
136. Id.






keep out of a case issues that are known to be false by the attorney
who signs a given pleading," concluded that "the violation of the
Rule in this case is clear and unmistakable.""' Consequently, the
court ordered its opinion filed separately in the office of the Clerk
of Court and indexed against the attorney's name "so that, in the
event that his professional conduct in any other connection shall
become a subject of inquiry, this case and this record can be re-
ferred to for such instruction as it [sic] may yield.
14 1
Rothman is an interesting case for several reasons. First, it can
be interpreted as imposing a requirement of "continuing certifica-
tion"-a requirement that if an attorney discovers after filing a
pleading that it lacks good ground, he must take steps to amend or
to withdraw it or be treated as if he had initially filed without good
ground. Although this seems logical," the continuing certification
requirement is by no means clear from the face of Rule 1 1 .11, Sec-
ond, the court's treatment of the Fair Trade Act allegation illus-
trates the general reluctance to impose the sanctions of Rule 11
when there is any reasonably colorable (or, in this instance, any
remotely colorable) basis for the pleading at issue.' Finally, the
court's disciplinary measures-essentially a reprimand and a filing
of the rebuke for future reference-seem rather anemic under the
circumstances. As a result of the conduct of defendant's attorney,
the court was called upon to adjudicate a counterclaim that the
attorney knew to be based on a nonexistent contract. This situa-
tion is close to a polar case of groundlessness, and it is questionable
whether a mere reprimand, albeit indexed next to the attorney's
name for future reference, is either an adequate penalty or an ade-
quate deterrent.
In re Lavine' wag a disciplinary proceeding against an attor-
ney who had requested a federal court, in the exercise of its bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, to enjoin a state court from proceeding in the
dissolution of his client, the Los Angeles County Pioneer Society." 7
In obtaining the injunction, the attorney made repeated and exten-
sive representations that certain funds of the Pioneer Society were
held in trust for it by the Historical Society of Southern Califor-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Risinger, supra note 1, at 58-59.
144. See text accompanying notes 111-15 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 137-39 supra.
146. 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In-re Los Angeles
County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954).
147. 126 F. Supp. at 40-41.
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nia.'4 ' He sought to have the Pioneer Society, after payment of its
debts from the funds in the Historical Society's possession, rein-
stated in the possession of those assets.'"' The attorney also in-
duced the federal court to issue an injunction restraining the His-
torical Society from disposing of the assets it allegedly held in trust
for the Pioneer Society.' 0 He failed to disclose, however, that all of
the claims against the Pioneer Society had already been disal-
lowed by the state court in the dissolution proceedings.'"' More-
over, the federal court discovered after issuing the injunctions that
the assets held by the Pioneer Society had been adjudged four
years earlier to constitute a public trust fund for charitable pur-
poses, that the Historical Society had been appointed successor
trustee of all those assets, and that the highest court of the state
had affirmed the decision divesting the Pioneer Society of title to
the funds.' 2 The federal court observed: "Any man in the street
. . .would presumably have a better-grounded legal claim to this
trust fund [than the Pioneer Society]; at the very least. . . the bar
of res judicata . . .would not confront his claim.' 51 3 These facts
were concealed by the attorney Lavine in seeking the injunctions. 4
After condemning Lavine's conduct as "incredibly callous chi-
cane and deceit,""' the federal court turned to a consideration of
"appropriate disciplinary action" under Rule 11." It noted that
Lavine had been convicted of the felony of attempted extortion
twenty-four years earlier. Although he had been pardoned by the
Governor, the court stated that the conviction, considered in con-
junction with Lavine's present conduct, shed light upon his moral
fitness for the practice of law.57 Consequently, the court disbarred
Lavine for his "willful violation of Rule 11," his "willful and delib-
erate fraud" on the court, and his "willful and deliberate abuse" of
the court's injunctive processes.' The Ninth Circuit reversed the
order of disbarment on procedural due process grounds,' 5' but did
not challenge the district court's premise that disbarment is some-
times an appropriate disciplinary measure under Rule 11.
148. Id. at 40.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 41.
151. Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 42-43.
153. Id. at 50.
154. Id. at 42-43, 50.
155. Id. at 47.
156. Id. at 48-51.
157. Id. at 49-50.
158. Id. at 51.
159. In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190, 192-94 (9th Cir. 1954).
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Although Lavine's misdeeds were more elaborate than those of
defendant's counsel in American Auto. Ass'n v. Rothman,' the
difference is one of degree rather than kind. In both cases, the at-
torneys' conduct led the courts to confront meritless claims. While
Lavine's misrepresentations and concealments showed somewhat
greater signs of calculation than did those of his counterpart in
Rothman, it strains credulity to suggest that this difference, cou-
pled with Lavine's twenty-four-year-old criminal conviction, justi-
fies the tremendous disparity between the sanctions imposed on
Lavine and the slap on the wrist administered to the errant attor-
ney in Rothman.
In Nichols v. Alker'"' plaintiffs alleged fraud and conspiracy in
the reorganization and consolidation of a corporation.' The com-
plaint asserted that certain defendants were officers or directors of
the business during the reorganization; actually, these persons were
neither officers nor directors at the time alleged, a fact ascertain-
able from public records.8 3 The complaint also alleged that one of
'the defendants was an employee of the Securities and Exchange
Commission at the time of certain alleged negotiations, though the
Commission's records revealed that this was chronologically impos-
sible."4 According to the complaint, one defendant knowingly gave
misleading testimony to the Commission during the reorganization
proceedings; in fact, the individual never testified."5 Finally, plain-
tiff inaccurately alleged that the instant suit was authorized by
certain common stockholders of the corporation, when their author-
ization actually extended only to the original reorganization pro-
ceedings concluded four years earlier.' Pursuant to Rule 11, the
court struck the complaint as sham.'67 It declined to discipline
plaintiff's counsel, however, noting that under local rules of court
the chief judge had charge of all matters relating to discipline of
attorneys.' The court left open the possibility of proceedings
against plaintiff's counsel in conformity with the rules of the
court,"9 but no record exists whether such proceedings were ever
instituted.
160. See text accompanying notes 130-40 supra.
161. 126 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
162. Id. at 680.
163. Id. at 683.
164. Id.
165. Id.






Some of the misstatements in the Nichols complaint may have
stemmed from a failure of plaintiff's attorney to undertake mini-
mal investigation, rather than from willful perpetration of or acqui-
escence in a falsehood. Hence, in this respect the case may be a
hybrid. The issue of the duty of counsel to investigate the veracity
of a pleading is posed more clearly by Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln
Federal Savings & Loan Association. 170
Plaintiffs in Kinee brought an antitrust action against various
mortgage lenders."' The conduct complained of was use of the es-
crow method.7 2 Plaintiffs sued every individual and institution
listed in the local telephone directory as a mortgage broker; more
than one-fourth of these parties did not practice the escrow method
and were dismissed from the suit."3 The court commented:
The plaintiffs' attorneys set out a dragnet. Having put a large number
of parties to the inconvenience, expense and possible anxiety of being
sued, they then were able conveniently to separate the wheat from the
chaff .... They chose to inconvenience a large number of parties
rather than inconvenience themselves with proper investigation as to
who the proper parties would be.'
The court condemned the use of a complaint to discover which par-
ties, in a class of potential defendants, are appropriate objects of
suit.75 It stated, however, that if plaintiffs' counsel had undertaken
reasonable investigation, and some of the mortgage lenders had
failed to cooperate, counsel's use of the complaint to ferret out the
proper defendants might have been justified.176 On the facts
presented, the court concluded that plaintiffs' attorneys had vio-
lated Rule 11 insofar as the complaint extended to lenders who did
not use the escrow method; the litigation expenses incurred by
those parties were taxed to plaintiffs' attorneys.1 7 Apart from its
allusion to Rule 11, the court did not discuss the authority for its
choice of sanctions. 78
Kinee carries the application of Rule 11 beyond the cases pre-
viously discussed. Plaintiffs' counsel in Kinee did not know that
the claims lacked good ground with respect to any specific defen-
dant; counsel knew only that there was a class of parties, some of
170. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
171. Id. at 977.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 982.
174. Id.






whom were arguably proper defendants and some of whom were
not, and in order to determine which were which they filed their
complaint against the whole class. The court properly condemned
this blunderbuss method as an abuse of the judicial system, at
least when plaintiffs had not undertaken reasonable investigation
first. The sanction imposed by the Kinee court has many attractive
features. It provides full compensation to those who are injured by
the attorney's transgression, but does not raise the risk of striking
an otherwise legitimate complaint.'79 Most courts, however, have
been reluctant to impose attorneys' fees as a sanction. 8 '
In Ferrer Delgado v. Sylvia de Jesus' plaintiff sought to have
a federal district court vacate an adverse judgment entered in a
Puerto Rico court and enjoin the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
from enforcing the judgment.' Plaintiff made this attempt in the
face of the federal anti-injunction statute,8 3 which prohibits federal
courts from enjoining proceedings in state courts except in certain
special circumstances. 4 Although plaintiff contended that his ac-
tion was a civil rights suit fitting within a recognized exception to
the anti-injunction statute, the court held that the complaint failed
to meet the prerequisites for a civil rights action. 8 5 No conspiracy
was alleged, no state official was a defendant, and the only parties
who could be enjoined were judges and other judicial officers
cloaked with immunity in the performance of their duties.'86 More-
over, the complaint did not present any other federal question.'
Relying primarily on a Puerto Rican procedural rule but also citing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the court assessed defendant's
reasonable counsel fees against plaintiff.'88 The opinion does not
mention the imposition of any sanctions upon plaintiff's attorney.
Ferrer Delgado raises the issue of legal, as opposed to factual,
frivolity. Extreme caution is necessary in this field lest good faith
arguments for a modification of existing law be penalized or dis-
couraged. There are probably no general standards that can be
prescribed. The potential range of situations is so great that an ad
hoc approach, if not intellectually satisfying, is perhaps the least
179. Cf. Risinger, supra note 1, at 43 (praising Kinee approach).
180. See text accompanying notes 217-21 infra.
181. 440 F. Supp. 979 (D.P.R. 1976).
182. Id. at 979, 981.
183. See id. at 981.
184. Id.






dangerous option, provided that it is coupled with a general admo-
nition to the courts to find legal frivolity only in instances of ex-
treme abuse.18' In Ferrer Delgado the finding of frivolity warranting
imposition of sanctions was justified. The case may be criticized,
however, for imposing defendant's attorneys' fees solely on plain-
tiff without exacting any penalty from plaintiff's attorney. It
scarcely seems fair that plaintiff, presumably untutored in the law,
should bear the full brunt of the punishment when the lawyer who
drafted the meritless complaint escapes any discipline.
In Nemeroff v. Abelson 90 plaintiff alleged that defendants, who
included a well-known financial columnist, a prominent financial
publishing house, and various stock dealers, had engaged in a con-
spiracy to manipulate the price of a stock through the dissemina-
tion of unfavorable reports." ' These contentions were based almost
entirely on gossip circulating among persons who held substantial
positions in the stock concerned."2 The only shadow of independent
corroboration was the existence of ongoing investigations by the
New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission into the alleged manipulation; these investigations, more-
over, had been initiated at the behest of the same persons who in-
dicated to plaintiff's counsel that defendants were conspiring to
manipulate the stock."13 More than a month before the complaint
was filed, plaintiff's attorney was informed of the Stock Exchange's
tentative conclusion that the accusations were unfounded.'94 Even-
tually a stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice of plain-
tiff's action were filed, subject to defendants' right to move for an
award of attorneys' fees and other expenses."15 They so moved."'
The federal district court first summarized the "evidence"
plaintiff's counsel had presented in his affidavit."7 It pointed out
that most of the items recited in the affidavit were inadmissible
hearsay and that the few admissible items could not possibly be
tortured into a cause of action."8 Although the court conceded that
plaintiff and others believed defendants were guilty of the conspir-
acy charged, it stressed the responsibility of plaintiff's counsel to
189. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
190. 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
191. Id. at 631-32.
192. Id. at 633-35.
193. Id. at 635-36.
194. Id. at 634.
195. Id. at 632.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 637-39.
198. Id. at 639.
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refrain from making allegations that were unsupported by legal evi-
dence. 9 The suit was motivated, the court reasoned, by a desire to
generate publicity detrimental to defendants."' Regarding whether
to assess costs against plaintiff, the court noted
[t]he ultimate question concerning taxing of attorneys' fees and ex-
penses as costs against plaintiff and/or his counsel under Rule 11, ...
[Section] 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, . . . or the court's
equitable power is whether the plaintiff and/or counsel instituted the
action "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. ' '",
The court emphasized the devastating effect that allegations like
plaintiff's could have on the reputations and livelihoods of the pub-
lishing defendants0 2 and concluded that by filing such a claim with
no significant evidential basis, plaintiff and his attorney proceeded
"in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."2
The court awarded the publishing defendants about one-fourth of
the attorneys' fees sought and taxed this amount against plaintiff
and his counsel.2 4 In contrast, no attorneys' fees were awarded to
the defendant stock dealers. 2 5 The court reasoned that because no
special propensity for harm to the stock dealers' reputations was
apparent, bad faith with respect to those defendants had not been
shown. Absent such a showing, the court concluded, an award of
attorneys' fees and related expenses was not proper. 29
Nemeroff in effect grafted onto Rule 11 the proviso that the
aggrieved party must show bad faith before a court will assess at-
torneys' fees as a sanction. Interestingly, the cases cited for this
novel proposition dealt with the federal bad faith exception to the
general rule against recovery of attorneys' fees27 rather than specif-
199. Id. at 635-36.
200. Id. at 635.
201. Id. at 637 (citations omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 640.
204. Id. at 642. The court found that an award of $50,000 in attorneys' fees and other
expenses was "sufficient," id., even though the publishing defendants had shown expendi-
tures of about $200,000. Id: at 632. The court did not explain why it considered a partial
award sufficient.
205. Id. at 640-41.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 640. The federal bad faith exception is beyond the scope of this Note.
Briefly stated, the so-called American Rule requires parties to bear their own counsel fees
absent a statutory provision, contractual agreement, or judicial exception to the contrary.
See generally note 68 supra. One of the judicial exceptions allows an award of attorneys' fees
to be assessed against a party who acts in bad faith or for "vexatious, wanton, or oppressive
reasons." See, e.g., F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (2d Cir. 1977).
For a catalogue of other judicially created exceptions to the American Rule, as well as
express Congressional provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees under certain federal
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ically with Rule 11. Kinee had awarded attorneys' fees under Rule
11 without requiring a showing of bad faith.208 Nemeroffs wholesale
importation of the jurisprudence of the federal bad faith exception
into Rule 11 reflects a commendable desire to unify a fragmented
area of the law, but it raises many problems. If Rule 11 in itself
provides no basis for an assessment of attorneys' fees,2 9 the "will-
ful" violation for which an attorney "may be subjected to appropri-
ate disciplinary action" under the rule '10 must be something less
than the bad faith required by Nemeroff. The Nemeroff court also
noted that the federal bad faith standard is akin to the malice re-
quirement in the action for malicious prosecution. " ' This observa-
tion is accurate, 212 but in a malicious prosecution action the malice
requirement functions in tandem with the separate requirement of
lack of probable cause. The complaining party may show the one
and yet fail to prove the other.1 3 By contrast, the federal bad faith
exception to the general rule against assessing attorneys' fees sub-
sumes an objective standard of groundlessness; the claim must be
"entirely without color"21' and asserted "wantonly, for purposes of
harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons. ' 215 "Entirely
without color" may or may not be a more demanding standard
than "lacking probable cause." In sum, Nemerofi's juxtaposition of
differing standards, each bearing the imprint of a distinct deci-
sional tradition, bears as much potential for confusion as for
enlightenment. This does not mean that a unitary view of the
problem of groundless suit is inappropriate, but rather that a
comprehensive legislative approach is more appropriate than a
piecemeal judicial one.
statutes, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62 & nn.
33-35 (1975).
208. See text accompanying notes 171-78 supra. It may be argued that the plaintiffs in
Kinee in fact acted in bad faith with respect to the wrongfully sued mortgage lenders (i.e.
those who did not practice the escrow method), but a reading of the Kinee opinion indicates
that the court felt Rule 11 in itself was an adequate basis for the sanction it ordered.
209. Nemeroff has been cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in United States v
Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979).
210. See note 6 supra and text accompanying note 115 supra.
211. 469 F. Supp. at 640.
212. Compare Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088 (2d Cir. 1977) (claim is in bad faith when asserted without color and "wantonly, for
purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons") (emphasis added) with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 676 (1977) (claim brought primarily for purposes other
than an adjudication of the merits may constitute grounds for liability).
213. See text accompanying notes 32-48 supra.





B. Summary and Critique
Rule 11, both as formulated and as applied, has many short-
comings. The vagueness of the phrase "appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion" is mirrored by a vagueness in the case law as to the proper
sanctions, as seen in the comparision of Rothman and In re La-
vine.216 Imposition of counsel fees is potentially the most effective
sanction against an attorney who violates the rule, but Nemeroff
has confused this topic by inserting into Rule 11, as a prerequisite
for imposition of attorneys' fees, a requirement that the judicially




Moreover, the current trend is toward the view that the federal bad
faith exception should be construed narrowly and applied spar-
ingly. 218 This development certainly does not bode well for the via-
bility of the counsel fees sanction. Rule 11 has more fundamental
defects as well. The language of the rule is punitive; it addresses,
as it should, the problem of deterrence of meritless suits, but there
is no explicit mention of the problem of compensation. 2t' Al-
though some courts have employed the rule for compensatory pur-
poses as well as deterrence, 220 nothing on the face of the rule makes
this approach mandatory. Moreover, the rule's sanctions extend
only to attorneys, not to the parties they represent. Finally, there
has been considerable reluctance on the part of the courts to apply
Rule 11 at all.2'
Nevertheless, Rule 11 has some appealing features that should
be taken into account in the formulation of a unified procedural
technique. It offers greater flexibility than does the proposed coun-
terclaim for groundless suit previously discussed.22 2 Under the latter
approach, the determination of probable cause, and hence the reso-
lution of the counterclaim, would follow the determination of the
case on the merits; the wronged original defendant would get no
redress until that time.22 Generally, it is appropriate for the deter-
mination of groundlessness to be postponed until after adjudication
of the merits; otherwise, the original plaintiff might not have an
adequate opportunity to make out a bona fide, though novel, argu-
216. See text accompanying notes 130-60 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 207-10 supra.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979)
(bad faith exception should be employed "only in exceptional cases and for dominating rea-
sons of justice").
219. See note 6 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 171-79 supra.
221. See note 127 supra.




ment.124 There are some situations, however, in which the ground-
lessness of a claim is patently apparent to all parties before the suit
goes to judgmentY2 In those circumstances, it is appropriate for
the meritless claims to be disposed of and sanctions to be applied
against the transgressing claimant or his counsel, prior to final ad-
judication. If the sanctions are designed, as in Kinee, to compen-
sate the injured parties as well, so much the better.
IV. OTHER APPROACHES
A. Section 1927 of Title 28
Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that "[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States. . .who so multiplies the proceed-
ings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess
costs."' On its face, section 1927 would seem to provide a useful
technique for dealing with meritless suits. Unfortunately, a split of
authority over the appropriate costs allowable severely impairs the
utility of this section. On the one hand, the Second Circuit 2 1 and
several district courts228 have imposed upon offending attorneys
counsel fees and other litigation expenses reasonably incurred by
the opposing parties. On the other hand, the Fifth,2 ' Sixth,2' and
Seventh Circuits2sl have held that the only costs assessable under
section 1927 are the relatively nominal amounts contemplated by
section 1923 of the Judicial Code.? 2 This narrow reading would of
course vitiate the effectiveness of section 1927 as a remedial device.
The usual rationale for this restrictive interpretation-that
section 1927 is penal in nature and therefore should be strictly
construed and read in pari materia with the very circumscribed
definition of taxable costs in sections 1920 through 1923 2 -is
questionable. Section 1927, in its condemnation of "unreasonable"
224. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 130-42 supra.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976).
227. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-89 (2d
Cir. 1977).
228. See Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1979) (collect-
ing district court cases).
229. Id.
230. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1976).
231. 1507 Corp. v. Henderson, 447 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971).
232. See, e.g., Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1979).
233. See id.; United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976); 1507 Corp. v.
Henderson, 447 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920-1923 (1976).
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and "vexatious" conduct that increases costs, sounds very much
like the standard formulation of the federal bad faith exception.2
4
Thus, it would seem that the bad faith exception to the rule
against awards of attorneys' fees could be invoked in any case in
which section 1927 had been violated. In any event, the uncertainty
currently surrounding the scope of allowable costs under section
1927 renders it a tool of very limited value.
B. The Court's Inherent Disciplinary Power and the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Though courts possess considerable inherent power to disci-
pline attorneys who practice before them,"5 the power is rarely in-
voked to control meritless suits-perhaps because, as one writer
suggests, "American lawyers and American courts have always
been less than aggressive in using their powers to fasten liability
onto other lawyers." ' Nevertheless, it may be helpful to consider
the relevance of the Code of Professional Responsibility 3 (Code) to
the problem of unfounded litigation. Although the Disciplinary
Rules of the Code are intended for the use of "enforcing agen-
cies," 23' presumably meaning bar associations, the Ethical Consid-
erations and Disciplinary Rules provide at least persuasive author-
ity for the courts in the exercise of their inherent powers to regulate
attorneys' conduct.239 The Ethical Considerations "are aspirational
in character and represent the objectives toward which every mem-
ber of the profession should strive. '2 4  The Disciplinary Rules
"state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action. 2' The Canons are
generalized "statements of axiomatic norms.
2 2
Canon 1 requires attorneys to "assist in maintaining the integ-
rity and competence of the legal profession. 2 3 Pursuant to Canon
1, Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A) forbids lawyers from engaging in con-
duct that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"
234. See note 207 supra.
235. See generally Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the
Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. RFv. 619 (1977).
236. Risinger, supra note 1, at 47.
237. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
238. Id. at 1 (Preliminary Statement).
239. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1083 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting).
240. ABA CODE, supra note 237, at 1 (Preliminary Statement).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id., Canon 1.
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or that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice. '"2 4 The for-
mer proscription would reach cases of factually dishonest pleading
like that in In re Lavine, 4 whereas the latter could be read as
encompassing the initiation of meritless litigation, but is probably
too vague to be of much value in this connection.
Canon 2 requires lawyers to assist the profession "in fulfilling
its duty to make legal counsel available."4 6 Disciplinary Rule 2-110
limits the lawyer's right to withdraw from employment once he
has taken a case.2 7 The rule provides, however, that the attorney
must withdraw if he is aware or it is obvious that his client is
"having steps taken for him merely for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injurying [sic] any person," '48 or if he knows or it is
plain that his continued employment would result in the breach of
a Disciplinary Rule. 24' The attorney may withdraw if his client "in-
sists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted
under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argu-
ment for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,"' 0
or if the client insists-that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct
that is illegal or forbidden by the Disciplinary Rules.2  Further-
more, the attorney may withdraw if his continued employment is
"likely" to lead to a breach of a Disciplinary Rule.
2
Finally, Canon 7 imposes the duty to represent one's client
"zealously within the bounds of the law. 253 Ethical Consideration
7-121 reiterates this obligation of zealous representation and Disci-
plinary Rule 7-101 forbids a lawyer from intentionally failing "to
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably availa-
ble means. '"25 The lawyer may, "where permissible" (a phrase not
further elaborated by the Code) and in the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment, refrain from asserting a right or position of his
client 26 and refuse to aid or to take part in "conduct that he be-
lieves to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an
244. Id., DR 1-102(A)(4)-(5).
245. See text accompanying notes 146-54 supra.
246. ABA CODE, supra note 237, Canon 2.
247. Id., DR 2-110.
248. Id., DR 2-110(B)(1).
249. Id., DR 2-110(B)(2).
250. Id., DR 2-110(C)(1)(a).
251. Id., DR 2-110(C)(1)(c).
252. Id., DR 2-110(C)(2).
253. Id., Canon 7.
254. Id., EC 7-1.
255. Id., DR 7-101(A)(1).
256. Id., DR 7-101(B)(1). "Where permissible" may be intended to incorporate DR 7-
102 by reference. See text accompanying note 260 infra.
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argument that the conduct is legal. 257 The zealous advocate must
remain within legal bounds, as well as the bounds of the Disci-
plinary Rules. Ethical Consideration 7-4 states that the advocate
"may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his
client" including a position "supportable by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law," regardless of
"his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction
will ultimately prevail."' s Nonetheless, "a lawyer is not justified in
asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous." ' 1 This subjective
requirement of good faith is echoed in Disciplinary Rule 7-102,
which provides that an attorney shall not "knowingly" advance a
claim that is "unwarranted under existing law" unless he can sup-
port the claim by good faith advocacy of a change in the law.
20
In summary, the Code's applicability to cases of factually dis-
honest pleading is relatively clear,261 although the problem of fail-
ure to conduct minimal investigation-as distinct from the making
of affirmative misrepresentations or calculated concealments-is
not explicitly treated. The Code does not provide much help on the
question of legal frivolity, but perhaps it should not be expected
to. 22 The primary value of the Code lies in the fact that it points
out the competing ethical principles and policy interests that must




257. ABA CODE, supra note 237, DR 7-101(B)(2).
258. Id., EC 7-4.
259. Id.
260. Id., DR 7-102(A)(2).
261. See text accompanying note 245 supra.
262. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
263. The tort action for civil conspiracy may sometimes be available to a groundlessly
sued party. A civil conspiracy is a combinatioi of two or more persons to achieve by con-
certed action an unlawful purpose, or to effectuate a lawful purpose by unlawful means,
proximately causing detriment to another. Fink v. Sheridan Bank, 259 F. Supp. 899, 902-03
(W.D. Okla. 1966). Some overt act must be done in furtherance of the conspirators' common
design. Baker v. Rangos, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 333, 551, 324 A.2d 498, 506 (1974). An act need
not be criminal in order to be "unlawful" within the meaning of the definition; any willful
and actionable infringement of a civil right suffices. Cranston v. Bluhm, 33 Wis. 2d 192, 198,
147 N.W.2d 337, 340 (1967). The gravamen of a civil conspiracy action is damages; indeed,
it is often stated that the action does not lie by reason of the conspiracy itself, but rather by
reason of torts committed pursuant to the conspiracy. E.g., Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co.,
87 F. Supp. 438, 442 (W.D. Mo. 1949). See generally Note, Civil Conspiracy and Interference
with Contractual Relations, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 302 (1975).
Injured defendants have rarely employed the civil conspiracy action against groundless
claimants, but there are many circumstances in which such an approach would be feasible.
For example, the meritless suit might be part of a conspiracy to injure the victim's reputa-
tion or business. Such conspiracies are actionable. Cf. Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co.,
256 N.C. 382, 391, 124 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1962) (conspiracy to slander); Savard v. Selby, 19
Ariz. App. 514, 517, 508 P.2d 773, 776 (1973) (conspiracy to force persons out of business by
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
A. The Need for a Unified Statutory Approach
A synoptic view of the problem of unfounded litigation is
sorely needed. It is unrealistic, however, to expect such a treatment
to emanate from the courts. As remarked earlier, Nemeroffs val-
iant attempt at a synthetic approach may simply have further be-
fogged an already foggy area of the law." 4 This is perfectly under-
standable, for courts are attentive to precedent, and the precedents
in this field reflect widely disparate assumptions and approaches;
any attempt to reconcile standards evolved in differing conceptual
frames of reference is fraught with difficulties. The problem of mer-
itless suit, and of course, meritless defense, dilatory motion prac-
tice, and the various other abuses that this Note has refrained from
treating in detail, is ripe for legislative intervention:
B. Important Characteristics of a Uniform Statute
(1) Procedural Mechanics
A party injured by a meritless suit should not ordinarily be
compelled to rely on a subsequent suit for compensation. " 5 The pu-
nitive and compensatory measures should be internal to the under-
lying action; the proposed counterclaim for groundless suit pro-
vides a useful model. 6 Normally, the determination of the
counterclaim would follow the adjudication of the main suit on the
merits. " 7 Allowance should be made, however, for the bringing of
the counterclaim prior to the decision of the main suit when the
claimant in that suit has made allegations that are manifestly false
or that reveal a failure to conduct even a modicum of investiga-
tion."' Furthermore, it should be possible to bring the counterclaim
against either the original claimant or his attorney or both, de-
unlawful means said to be actionable, though court held no such claim made out on facts at
hand). Interesting possibilities are also suggested by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871
(1977), which provides that one who intentionally and unjustifiably deprives another of a
legally protected property interest or impairs that interest is subject to liability. If two or
more persons knowingly launch an unfounded attack on title to commercial realty, for exam-
ple, in an effort to extract a speedy settlement, a strong argument can be made that they are
civilly liable for conspiracy to commit intentional harm to a property interest. Because the
action for civil conspiracy sounds in tort, attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torm § 914(1) (1977).
264. See notes 207-15 supra and accompanying text.
265. See text accompanying notes 93-97 and 106-07 supra.
266. See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra.
267. See id.
268. See text accompanying notes 222-25 supra.
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pending upon the nature and source of the abuse.2 9 Finally,
common-law actions for malicious prosecution should remain
available in cases of extraordinary injury not compensable by
the counterclaim. 70
(2) The Standard of Culpability
The original advocate of the counterclaim for groundless suit
makes lack of probable cause the sole requisite for recovery.27' This
author, out of a desire to minimize the risk of a chilling effect on
the advancement of innovative legal theories, 272 would add a re-
quirement that malice be shown. This burden could be met in ei-
ther of two ways. Factually dishonest pleading, whether dishonest
by virtue of affirmative falsehood or substantial and calculated
concealment, or a gross failure to investigate of the kind exempli-
fied in Kinee,23 would be malice per se. In cases of alleged legal
frivolity, however, the counterclaimant would have to show that
the original action was brought principally for a purpose other
than adjudication of the merits. This definition would replace the
oft-recited requirement of bad faith or wanton and oppressive con-
duct found in the federal case law dealing with awards of attorneys'
fees.
(3) Sanctions
Sanctions against meritless claimants should be graded prima-
rily according to the magnitude of the injury inflicted. The sanc-
tions should be designed to compensate the wronged parties for all
damages suffered or expenses reasonably incurred by them as a
result of the unfounded suit. Factual dishonesty and other extreme
abuses could justify punitive damages. Transgressing attorneys
should still be subject to potential disciplinary action distinct
269. The statute would have to make an exception to the general rule that an attorney
may not testify in a case he is trying. In order to minimize the danger of confusing or preju-
dicing the jury, the inquiry into the attorney's alleged misfeasance should probably be con-
ducted in chambers or by means of submission of written justifications by the attorney. If
the attorney's misconduct were so extreme as to warrant application of the contempt
power, greater procedural safeguards for him would be necessary, and a separate jury pro-
ceeding with a different judge might be mandated. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455 (1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Contempt would not be a prerequisite to
liability on the counterclaim.
270. See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1237.
271. See id. at 1234-35.
272. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
273. See text accompanying notes 171-78 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 211-15 supra.
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from any liability under the counterclaim; the statute should not
strip the courts of their inherent powers in this field.275
JOHN RAYMOND JONES, JR.
275. See text accompanying note 235 supra.

